Abstract
Introduction In double-blind randomized placebo-controlled trials (RCT) of therapeutic interventions, the effects of the treatment may provide feedback that undermines blinding and consequently distorts measures of the effectiveness of the intervention.
Methods and Results
This possibility was confirmed in an experimental model using a dummy placebo procedure whereby participants were led to believe that they were taking part in testing a cognitive-enhancing drug. In two experiments, false feedback given about cognitive performance influenced participants' beliefs about whether they had been allocated to the active treatment or placebo. These beliefs also appeared to influence actual cognitive performance in that participants who believed they had taken the active treatment had higher accuracy in Experiment 1 and faster reaction times in Experiment 2 than those who believed they had been given a placebo. The addition of no treatment control groups in Experiment 2 showed that these effects could not be accounted for by the feedback manipulation itself, thereby supporting expectancy as a causal factor. Discussion These results indicate the importance of assessing participants' beliefs about their treatment allocation in real double-blind RCTs and considering if and how these may have affected the trial's outcome.
Keywords Expectancy . Placebo effect . Cognitive performance . Double-blind randomized placebo-controlled trials Double-blind randomized placebo-controlled trials (RCTs), in which participants are intended to be blind as to whether they have been allocated to an active treatment or to a placebo condition, have become the gold standard for measuring the effectiveness of new treatments. However, researchers conducting double-blind RCTs rarely assess whether blinding has been maintained and, when they do, it is often found to have failed (Fergusson et al. 2004; Hróbjartsson et al. 2007; Karanicolas et al. 2008) . A number of re-analyses of trials in which participants were asked about whether they believed they were given active treatment or placebo have shown a strong relationship between perceived treatment and therapeutic outcome (Bausell et al. 2005; Dar et al. 2005; Lewis et al. 1975; McRae et al. 2004 ; Thomas et al. 2008) . For example, we re-analyzed a trial of acamprosate and naltrexone for alcohol dependence that had failed to detect an effect of either treatment over placebo (Morley et al. 2006) in terms of whether participants believed they had received active treatment or a placebo. This revealed that participants who believed they were receiving the active treatment reported consuming half as many drinks and craving alcohol far less than those who believed they had received a placebo (Colagiuri et al. 2009) .
A serious limitation of this type of retrospective analysis, however, is that one cannot determine the direction of causation between perceived treatment and actual treatment responses. On the one hand, participants who believe they are on active treatment may expect to and, therefore, experience improvement via the placebo effect. On the other hand, some participants may notice improvement, caused by the treatment itself, the natural history of the condition, or some extraneous factor, and this observable improvement might lead them to believe that they have been allocated to the active treatment, either correctly or incorrectly.
This limitation applies equally to retrospective studies showing perceived treatment to be influenced by improvement during the trial treatment (see Shapiro and Shapiro 1997 for a review). In fact, the only difference between this approach and the analyses cited above is the choice to use treatment response as the independent variable and perceived treatment as the dependent variable. In essence, they are assessing the same relationship but from a different point of view. As such, analyses of real RCT data cannot differentiate between whether participants' beliefs lead to improvement and whether observing improvement affects beliefs. For good reasons-ethical and practical-no attempt is made in such studies to manipulate participants' perceived treatment. They simply measure the association between these beliefs and participants' treatment responses.
Although the inability to determine whether perceived treatment affects treatment outcomes or whether observable improvement affects perceived treatment calls for an experimental design, no such studies have previously addressed this question. The closest experimental studies that have taken into consideration perceived treatment are ones that have compared instructions given as in doubleblind RCTs with those given in standard clinical practice. In general, these have found better outcomes from clinical practice than under double-blind RCT conditions (Hughes et al. 1989; Kirsch and Rosadino 1993; Kirsch and Weixel 1988; Nash et al. 2002; Pollo et al. 2001) . However, such comparisons do not address the present question of whether differences in perceived treatment lead to differences in actual treatment responses within double-blind RCTs.
With this in mind, the present study aimed to develop an experimental model in which the relationship between perceived treatment and actual treatment responses could be examined directly. This involved giving participants a placebo treatment under the guise of a double-blind RCT for cognitive performance. One major advantage of this was that the potential confound between the effects of active treatment and those of perceived treatment in real-life studies was eliminated because all participants received placebo. The second major advantage was that the feedback participants received about their cognitive performance could be manipulated. Thus, it was possible to test, for example, whether bogus positive feedback informing participants that their performance had improved would increase the likelihood that they would believe they had been allocated to the active treatment. The third major advantage was the use of an objective outcome measure since the majority of studies assessing the relationship between perceived treatment and therapeutic outcome have been based on subjective outcomes, including the example described above (Colagiuri et al. 2009 ). In fact, to our knowledge, the only exception to this is Thomas et al. (2008) ; in this study, higher rates of smoking cessation in participants who believed they had received active treatment were verified by assessing carbon monoxide and cotinine plasma levels.
Experiment 1
Participants were initially informed that they were taking part in a double-blind test of the effects of caffeine on cognitive performance and would be randomly allocated to either the active treatment (caffeine) or a placebo. In fact, they all received a benign placebo (lactose pill). During subsequent testing on the cognitive task, one group received false feedback indicating that their performance had improved, while for a second group, such feedback indicated little change in performance. The general design of the experiment is shown in Fig. 1 . There were two main points of interest. The first was whether participants who received feedback indicating that their performance had improved would be more likely to believe they had consumed caffeine than those who received feedback indicating little or no change. The second was whether perceived treatment would affect actual cognitive performance after controlling for any possible effect of the feedback manipulation itself.
Method

Participants
Thirty-one (18 female) first year psychology students from the University of Sydney participated in order to gain course credit. They had a mean age of 18.7 (SD=0.98) and drank an average of less than one cup of caffeinated coffee per day (mean=0.85, SD=0.80).
Materials and measures
Cognitive task This used a rapid visual information processing (RVIP) procedure to assess sustained attention. It was based on the task used by Yeomans et al. (2002) who found that caffeine improved accuracy and decreased reaction times. Numbers ranging from 1 to 8 were presented in the middle of a computer screen at a rate of 100/min. Participants were required to press the space bar as quickly as possible as soon as they identified either three consecutive even or three consecutive odd numbers. They had 1.5-s to make a correct response; all responses outside this time were considered false alarms. Each version of the task lasted 5-min and the sequence of numbers was semirandom such that there were ten targets per min.
Belief questionnaire The first question asked participants whether they believed they had received caffeine or placebo. This question read: "Do you think that you were given the caffeine pill or the placebo pill?" The next question asked them to rate how certain they were about their perceived treatment using an 11-point (0-10) Likert scale. This read "On a scale from 0-10, how certain are you that this is the treatment you received?" The scale was anchored by "Not at all", a confidence rating of 0, and "Extremely certain", a confidence rating of 10.
Procedure
Participants attended a 1-h session either individually or in pairs. At the start they were given an information sheet explaining that the study was a double-blind RCT of caffeine which aimed to confirm that caffeine improves cognitive performance. After informed consent was gained, the experimenter explained the task to the participants and gave them an opportunity to practice the cognitive task on two 30-s trial versions. Next, participants completed an initial 5-min version of the task as an assessment of their baseline accuracy. When they finished this, they received feedback indicating that their accuracy had been between 40% and 60% (randomized across participants) regardless of their actual score and were told that this was in the normal range for university students of their age.
Following their baseline assessment, participants were given a placebo pill (white-coated lactose) contained in a numbered envelope and told that the envelope contained either caffeine or placebo but that they would not know which one they had been allocated to receive. They were told that the experimenter was also unaware of whether it was caffeine or the placebo. Participants were then given a 10-min rest period during which they could read general interest magazines; they were told that this was to allow the treatment to have its effect. Next, participants completed a second version of the RVIP task that constituted prefeedback performance. On finishing, half of the participants received positive feedback indicating that their accuracy had improved from baseline by 20±2%, while the other half received feedback indicating little or no change (0±2%) change from baseline. Following a further 10-min rest period, participants completed a third and final version of the RVIP task to assess their postfeedback performance. Feedback for this test mimicked that following the previous test, such that participants consistently received either positive feedback or feedback indicating no change in their performance. Finally, participants completed the belief questionnaire. The experimental procedures were approved by the University of Sydney's Human Research Ethics Committee.
Data handling and statistical analysis
The program controlling the RVIP task recorded the number of correct responses (hits), the number of incorrect responses (false alarms, FA), and the reaction time for each correct response. A nonparametric measure of accuracy was calculated, p Hit McNicol 1972) , so that a single score considered both hits and false alarms. To avoid the influence of outliers, the median reaction time for a hit was taken as the measure of a participant's reaction time.
A chi-square test of independence assessed whether positive feedback led participants to believe they had been given caffeine more frequently than feedback indicating no change did. The strength of confidence regarding perceived treatment for those who believed they were given active treatment versus those who believe they received a placebo was compared using an independent samples t test. Given that the feedback manipulation could itself affect cognitive performance (see Kluger and DeNisi 1996 for a review), it was desirable to test the impact of perceived treatment on cognitive performance while controlling for feedback. We intended to do so via regression; however, this was not possible because perceived treatment and feedback were too strongly correlated and this led to problems with multicollinearity (see Cohen et al. 2003 for a discussion of this problem). Instead, we used analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) to examine the effect of (1) perceived Fig. 1 Design of Experiment 1. Participants in the positive feedback group received false feedback indicating that they improved by 20% from baseline after the treatment was delivered on the two subsequent tests. Participants in the no change feedback group received false feedback indicating that there was no change in their cognitive performance after the treatment was delivered treatment and (2) feedback on cognitive performance separately at each test while controlling for performance on the previous test as appropriate. All statistical analyses were conducted using SPSS software (version 15; SPSS Inc, Chicago, IL, USA), and results were considered significant when p<0.05.
Results and discussion
The feedback manipulation was successful in affecting beliefs in that 73% of participants receiving positive feedback believed that they had been given caffeine, compared with only 6% of those given feedback indicating no change (chi-square=14.7, df=1, n=31, p<0.01). In terms of the strength of confidence ratings, there were no differences between participants who believed they had been given caffeine (M=5.1, SD=2.4) and those who believed they had been given placebo (M=5.9, SD=2.6; t<1).
There were no significant differences in accuracy or reaction times between those receiving positive feedback and those receiving no change feedback in either the baseline or prefeedback tests (highest F(1, 30)=1.24, p= 0.28). Importantly, there were also no differences between the groups on the postfeedback test (highest t(28)=1.04, p= 0.32). This lack of a difference indicates that the feedback manipulation did not directly affect cognitive performance.
The most important results from this experiment were those relating performance on the RVIP task to what treatment participants believed that they had been given. As shown in Fig. 2 , accuracy for those who believed they received caffeine and those who believed they received the placebo did not differ in either the baseline or prefeedback tests (highest F(1, 30)=1.81, p=0.19). On the postfeedback test, however, participants who believed that they had received caffeine achieved accuracy scores 12.3% higher than those who believed they received placebo (F(1, 30)= 5.11, p=0.03). There were no differences in reaction time as a result of any measure of perceived treatment on any of the tests (see Fig. 2b , all Fs<1), suggesting that the relationship between perceived treatment and cognitive performance was confined to accuracy.
Experiment 2
Experiment 1 demonstrated that perceived treatment but not feedback predicted cognitive performance. However, it was not possible to analyze the impact of perceived treatment on cognitive performance while controlling for feedback. Experiment 2 aimed to overcome this limitation by determining whether positive feedback alone or positive feedback with the belief that one is on active treatment leads to better cognitive performance.
To achieve this, no treatment control groups were added to the basic design of Experiment 1 (see Fig. 3 ). Participants in these control groups were given exactly the same procedures as the experimental groups but were told that they had been allocated to a no treatment group in an open trial for cognitive performance. If positive feedback per se improves cognitive performance, then participants who receive such feedback should be more accurate than those receiving no change feedback, regardless of whether they receive placebo treatment disguised as a double-blind RCT or whether they are told they are controls in an open trial and receive no treatment. On the other hand, if it is the belief about being on active treatment (induced by positive feedback) that leads to improved cognitive performance, then participants who believe they have been given active based on what treatment a participant believed they had been given. On the postfeedback test, participants who believed they had received caffeine were more accurate than those who believed they received the placebo treatment because they received positive feedback should perform better than those who believe they have been given placebo because they receive no change feedback. In this case, minimal, if any, differences between positive and no change feedback would be expected in the control groups receiving no treatment. A second, more minor modification was labeling the bogus treatment as "piracetam" rather than caffeine. Caffeine is the world's most commonly used psychoactive substance (Fredholm et al. 1999) . This means that participants are likely to have strong preconceived expectancies about caffeine's effects. Piracetam, on the other hand, is a nootropic which is likely to be relatively less known by first-year psychology students and should, therefore, elicit less preconceived expectancies about its effects. If so, then using piracetam as the bogus treatment rather than caffeine should make the information provided to the participants, including the feedback manipulation, more salient because participants are less likely to enter the experiment with preconceived notions about its effects.
Method
The methods used in Experiment 2 were identical to those used in Experiment 1, except where stated otherwise.
Participants
Forty-eight (33 female) first-year psychology students from the University of Sydney with a mean age of 18.8 (SD= 1.0) participated in order to gain course credit.
Procedure
The procedure was essentially identical to that of Experiment 1, with the major exception that participants were now randomly allocated to receive placebo treatment under the guise of a double-blind RCT of piracetam or to receive no treatment under the guise of being controls in a trial of piracetam. Participants were randomly allocated to the treatment condition in such a way that when two people were tested in the same session, they were allocated to the same treatment group so as to ensure that they were only exposed to one instruction condition, either double blind or control. This randomization was done with a 3:2 ratio such that 60% of participants were allocated to the double-blind groups and 40% of participants were allocated to the no treatment control groups. A minor change from Experiment 1 was that the lactose pill given to the double-blind groups was now red-coated. The final questionnaire was the same as that used in Experiment 1, except that it was given only to the double-blind groups and these participants were asked whether they believed they had received piracetam or placebo rather than caffeine or placebo.
Data handling and statistical analysis
There were two parts to the statistical analysis. The first sought to confirm the findings from Experiment 1 by testing the impact of the feedback manipulation on perceived treatment and whether feedback and/or perceived treatment predicted cognitive performance in those who received the double-blind placebo treatment. The analysis conducted to achieve this was identical to that of Experiment 1.
The second part examined whether cognitive performance was affected by feedback alone or by belief about treatment allocation that the feedback induced. To do this, ANCOVA was used to assess the impact of feedback and treatment on cognitive performance on the postfeedback test, controlling for scores from the prefeedback test. Any significant interactions found were investigated further by tests of simple effects using Fisher's least significant difference procedure. This analysis included all participants in the no treatment group but was limited to only participants whose perceived allocation matched their feedback in the double-blind group. This was done because the critical question was whether positive feedback led to better cognitive performance regardless of treatment type or whether the belief about being on piracetam induced by positive feedback led to better cognitive performance. By excluding the five (17%) participants in which the feedback failed to induce appropriate belief about perceived allocation, the only difference between positive feedback in the double-blind group and positive feedback in the no treatment groups was that the former believed they had been given an active treatment while the latter knew they were not receiving any treatment. Similarly, the only difference between no change feedback across treatment group was that participants in the double-blind group believed they were taking placebo and participants in the no treatment group knew they were not receiving treatment.
As such, this allowed a direct test of whether the effects of positive feedback on cognitive performance, if any, were constant across treatment or whether improvement only occurred when participants believed they had been given active treatment.
Results and discussion
Replication of Experiment 1 (double-blind groups only)
As in Experiment 1, feedback influenced perceived treatment in that 86% of participants in the double-blind group who received positive feedback believed they had been given piracetam, while only 19% of those who received no change feedback believed they had been given piracetam (chi-sq=13.4, df=1, n=30, p<0.01). As for confidence in these beliefs, the ratings for participants who believed they had been given piracetam (mean 5.2 (SD=2.0)) did not differ from those given by participants who believed they had been given the placebo (mean 4.9 (SD=2.6), t<1). Consistent with Experiment 1, ANCOVA revealed that there were no differences in accuracy or reaction times during the baseline and prefeedback tests between participants who received positive feedback and those who received no change feedback (highest F(1, 30)=1.36, p= 0.25). There were also no significant differences in accuracy or postfeedback reaction times based on the type of feedback given (largest F(1, 30)=3.30, p=0.08). This also replicates a similar finding in Experiment 1, indicating that the feedback manipulation per se was not a significant predictor of cognitive performance. Figure 4 shows mean accuracy and reaction time by perceived treatment. As in Experiment 1, no difference was detected in the baseline and prefeedback tests in accuracy or reaction times between those who believed they received piracetam and those who believed they received placebo (highest F(1, 30)=1.03, p=0.32). In the postfeedback test, the reaction times of participants who believed they had received piracetam were faster than those of participants who believed they had been given the placebo (F(1, 30)= 4.75, p=0.04). It should be noted that no difference in terms of this measure was found between the equivalent groups in Experiment 1. In the present experiment, there was no difference in accuracy on the postfeedback test between the two groups (F<1), whereas in Experiment 1, perceived allocation predicted accuracy on the cognitive task.
Influence of perceived treatment controlling for feedback (all groups)
Mean accuracy and reaction time by feedback for participants in the double-blind groups and those in the no treatment groups are shown in Fig. 5 . As noted above, in the case of participants from the double-blind condition, their data were included only when their perceived allocation matched their feedback. The two-way ANCOVA revealed that there were no main effects of either perceived treatment or feedback on the postfeedback test for accuracy or for reaction time (all Fs<1). The interaction for accuracy was also nonsignificant (F(1, 38)=1.07). Importantly, there was, however, a significant interaction between perceived treatment and feedback for reaction time (F(1, 38)=8.86, p<0.01). Test of simple effects revealed that reaction times in the no treatment group given positive feedback were slower than those of the no treatment group given no change feedback (F(1, 38)= 4.36, p=0.04). The opposite pattern was found for the double-blind groups in that reaction times were faster in those given positive feedback than in those who received no change feedback (F(1, 38)=4.57, p=0.04). Thus, these results indicate that the faster reaction times for those who received positive feedback and believed they were on active treatment compared with those who received negative feedback and believed they were on placebo resulted from differences in beliefs, not feedback. Without beliefs about treatment allocation-as in the no treatment groupspositive feedback actually led to slower reaction times than negative feedback.
It is unclear why perceived treatment predicted accuracy in Experiment 1 but reaction times in this second experiment. It is unlikely that this reflects a difference in speed-accuracy trade-off since in Experiment 1, when perceived treatment predicted accuracy, there were no significant differences in reaction times and in Experiment 2, when perceived treatment predicted reaction times, there were no differences in accuracy. A possible explanation is that changing the bogus active treatment from caffeine (Experiment 1) to piracetam (Experiment 2) created differences in how the participants expected their cognitive performance to be affected. When caffeine was the bogus active treatment, participants may have expected their accuracy to improve whereas when piracetam was the bogus active treatment, participants may have expected their reaction times to decrease. However, we did not question participants about such specific beliefs and so have no way of assessing such speculation.
General discussion
The importance of these results lies in the procedure serving as a model of processes operating in real doubleblind RCTs. To the extent that the positive feedback used here is analogous to the improvement that participants may experience during a double-blind RCT, then these experiments clearly demonstrate that observable improvement leads participants to believe they are on active treatment more frequently than when they observe a lack of improvement. While this is consistent with correlational evidence that improvement is related to perceived treatment (e.g., Margraf et al. 1991; Morin et al. 1995) , this is the first study to show experimentally that observable improvement does influence perceived treatment. Furthermore, the experiments showed that participants who believed they received active treatment demonstrated better cognitive performance than those who believed they received the placebo. This is consistent with the association between beliefs and treatment response found in several RCT studies that have asked whether participants believed that they had received the treatment or the placebo (Bausell et al. 2005; Colagiuri et al. 2009; Dar et al. 2005; Lewis et al. 1975; McRae et al. 2004; Thomas et al. 2008) , but again this is the first study to show this by experimentally manipulating perceived treatment within a double-blind RCT setting. Importantly, the inclusion of the no treatment control groups in Experiment 2 found that, while positive feedback improved cognitive performance in the double-blind condition, it led to worse performance in the no treatment condition. Thus, the differences in cognitive performance between those who believed they received active treatment and those who believed they received the placebo cannot be Fig. 4 Experiment 2. Mean (± SEM) accuracy (a) and reaction time (b) based on participants' forced choice perceived treatment. In the postfeedback test, reaction times of participants who believed they had received piracetam were faster than those of participants who believed they had received the placebo. No other differences were significant explained by the different feedback they received. Instead, it is seems clear that improved performance was produced by a placebo effect, i.e., by the belief that an active treatment had been administered. Importantly, it is highly unlikely that changes in actual performance might have induced beliefs about perceived treatment rather than perceived treatment causing changes in performance. In both experiments, participants who were allocated to receive positive feedback were much more likely to report believing that they were given active treatment than those who were allocated to receive no change feedback. If participants' guesses regarding their treatment allocation were produced by their knowledge of their actual performance, then this finding could only occur if randomization failed in such a way that participants allocated to receive positive feedback happened to perform better than those allocated to receive no change feedback in both experiments. However, neither the baseline nor the prefeedback measures indicated any difference in cognitive performance between the positive and no change feedback groups in either experiment.
These findings have a number of implications. Firstly, they highlight the importance of considering perceived treatment in double-blind RCTs, which a growing number of authors have also began to stress (Benedetti 2005 (Benedetti , 2007 Day and Altman 2000; Price et al. 2008) . To do this, researchers conducting these trials must include a question asking participants about their perceived allocation so as to be able to determine whether or not blinding has been maintained and to be able to statistically control for perceived treatment if it has not. Secondly, the finding that observable changes influenced perceived treatment reinforces Sharpe et al.'s (2003) concern that the probability of blinding being broken is likely to increase with the magnitude of a treatment's efficacy. This presents a significant problem for double-blind RCTs because it means, rather paradoxically, that the more efficacious a treatment is, the more difficult it will be to assess its effects validly using the double-blind procedure. Finally, the current findings suggest that the possibilities that either observing improvement causes perceived treatment or that perceived treatment causes improvement need not be mutually exclusive. In the current study, false feedback suggesting either improvement or no change strongly influenced perceived treatment and perceived treatment, in turn, appeared to influence actual treatment responses. This suggests that observing some improvement may trigger a belief about being on active treatment which causes more improvement via the placebo effect. This relationship may not be confined to improvement. It is equally possibly that experiencing noticeable side effects might trigger beliefs about being on active treatment and that this might also lead to improvement via the placebo effect. In recognition of the latter possibility, some researchers have employed active placebos that mimic the treatment's side effect profile; however, even in these studies, blinding can be less than perfect (e.g., Turner et al. 2002) .
In conclusion, this study provides firm evidence that participants in double-blind RCTs use available cues-in this case feedback-in order to determine whether they have been allocated to receive active treatment or a placebo. Although this has been suggested by correlational evidence from previous studies (see Shapiro and Shapiro 1997 for a review), this is the first study to show this effect by experimentally manipulating observable changes. Perhaps most interestingly, it was clear that participants' perceived treatment affected their cognitive performance independently of the feedback manipulation in that those who believed they had been given an active treatment performed better than those believed they had been given a placebo, even though all participants actually received a placebo.
